Eclipses are proverbially fraught with forebodings. The solar eclipse of 1919 was no exception. Seen in retrospect, that eclipse marked the end of an old era and the beginning of a new in the philosophy of science. Not in science itself, be it noted, for the scientific life is a life of patience and sobriety and continuity, knowing little of what the world calls ‘sensation’. But for the onlookers, the philosophers of science, the event was drama. The reign of Newton, (...) long tottering, was finally broken; Einstein took up the vacant chair. Men were not slow to learn the lesson: if king-making can be done once it can be done again. Philosophy of science must needs hereafter be a philosophy of revolutions—whether continuous revolution or spasmodic revolutions is still a subject of debate. (shrink)

From the pen of Professor Geach we have learnt to expect the fastidious art of the microscopist. Not microscopy for its own sake, however, but microscopy as the vigilant servant, ensuring that large views, if and when they are built, shall be built only from sound materials. The present volume is a collection of nine papers—some previously published in journals, and some appearing for the first time. They exhibit the author’s painstaking skill in logical analysis, and his predilection for the (...) paths trodden by Aquinas and the later Wittgenstein. If they invite the charge of lengthy and sometimes tedious hair-splitting, the author has his answer ready: often hair-splitting is the only way to attain the truth. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an immense upsurge of writings on the philosophy of science. It is noticeable, however, that much of this writing is ‘philosophical’ in only a rather remote sense of the word. The Reader in the History and Philosophy of Science in the University of Cambridge has set out to recall philosophers of science to ‘the general nature of philosophical thinking and of the philosophical tradition that has accumulated over the centuries’. A complementary aim of the (...) work is ‘to remind the students of general philosophy that their philosophical heritage is deeply grounded in, if not originating from, speculation about science, showing that the methods and results of scientific enquiry have had a profound direction on philosophical thought’. (shrink)

This collection of papers arose out of an international conference on Newton held at the University of Western Ontario in 1967.

Plato, in the Phaedrus, expressed forebodings about the written word. And the history of hermeneutics does little to dispel Plato’s prophecy of ills to come. At the present time, observes Professor Hirsch, we are, as regards literary criticism, in the high tide of subjectivism and scepticism. The meaning of Scripture is a new revelation to each generation; the meaning of a literary text is what it means to us today, and whatever meaning the author may have intended is irrelevant. The (...) magisterium of the teacher, as the preserver of a heritage and the conveyor of knowledge, has gone: his reading is no more valid than that of a pupil. On the other hand, to shift the focus of discussion from the text to the author is equally unsatisfactory. This course leads us into a search for influences and an enquiry into authorial habits and experiences. Literary criticism degenerates into futility. We must endeavour to fix on a point between these two extremes, a point where an objectively valid interpretation emerges, an interpretation which links the mind of the reader with the mind of the author. We must presume that the author, when he wrote, meant something determinate by his text. Our task is to discover from the text what he meant. How best to perform this task is the theme of the present book. (shrink)

Professor Randall is already well known to students of Greek philosophy through his lively book on Aristotle published in 1960. If his treatment of the Stagirite had more of Aristotle than of Randall, the same can hardly be said of the present work, which is decidedly more Randall than Plato. Indeed it might fairly be described as a dramatic reverie on Plato. None the worse for that of course, since the touch of Socrates was meant to stimulate, but the reader (...) should be warned in advance not to expect the measured treatment of a Taylor or a Friedländer. (shrink)

The generation of American idealist philosophers came to an end effectively with the first World War. Idealism was superseded by a variety of philosophical schools: pragmatists, empiricists, positivists and latterly existentialists. Now there are signs of a return to idealism. The rising tide of social anomy, which the recent schools can do nothing to prevent, has directed men’s minds once more to the roots of community life. The writings of the idealists, hitherto dismissed as scarcely intelligible abstractions, are now being (...) read in chastened spirit with a new awareness of their purport. (shrink)

Professor Randall is already well known to students of Greek philosophy through his lively book on Aristotle published in 1960. If his treatment of the Stagirite had more of Aristotle than of Randall, the same can hardly be said of the present work, which is decidedly more Randall than Plato. Indeed it might fairly be described as a dramatic reverie on Plato. None the worse for that of course, since the touch of Socrates was meant to stimulate, but the reader (...) should be warned in advance not to expect the measured treatment of a Taylor or a Friedländer. (shrink)

The generation of American idealist philosophers came to an end effectively with the first World War. Idealism was superseded by a variety of philosophical schools: pragmatists, empiricists, positivists and latterly existentialists. Now there are signs of a return to idealism. The rising tide of social anomy, which the recent schools can do nothing to prevent, has directed men’s minds once more to the roots of community life. The writings of the idealists, hitherto dismissed as scarcely intelligible abstractions, are now being (...) read in chastened spirit with a new awareness of their purport. (shrink)

Transplantation of vital organs has been premised ethically and legally on "the dead donor rule" (DDR)—the requirement that donors are determined to be dead before these organs are procured. Nevertheless, scholars have argued cogently that donors of vital organs, including those diagnosed as "brain dead" and those declared dead according to cardiopulmonary criteria, are not in fact dead at the time that vital organs are being procured. In this article, we challenge the normative rationale for the DDR by rejecting the (...) underlying premise that it is necessarily wrong for physicians to cause the death of patients and the claim that abandoning this rule would exploit vulnerable patients. We contend that it is ethical to procure vital organs from living patients sustained on life support prior to treatment withdrawal, provided that there is valid consent for both withdrawing treatment and organ donation. However, the conservatism of medical ethics and practical concerns make it doubtful that the DDR will be abandoned in the near future. This leaves the current practice of organ transplantation based on the "moral fiction" that donors are dead when vital organs are procured. (shrink)

In this book the author presents an original argument for constitutive and ontological realism, developed against the backdrop of a reconstruction of Kantian philosophy. The first chapter argues that Kant does not primarily reject the epistemological principles of classical empiricism--that there are only two species of epistemic warrant possible for any judgment: logical warrants as analytic entailments and evidential warrants. Rather, Kant rejects its tacit commitment to an epistemological atomism, substituting for this a species of representational holism. The primary question (...) of legitimacy attaches not to individual concepts or judgments but to a larger conceptual structure in which they are embedded as logically indispensable features. Kant's transcendental deduction thus consists in the demonstrations of a family of analytic entailments which collectively secure a logical warrant for meta-judgments expressing the applicability of categorial concepts to, and the truth of corresponding judgments about, a world as a systematic experiential unity. (shrink)

This work is a study in the new field of paraconsistent logics. The authors attempt to give a formal characterization of the notions of indeterminate possible worlds and inconsistent possible worlds. The characterization works by constructing the non-standard worlds out of combinations of standard possible worlds either by taking those statements as true in a non-standard world which are true in both of two standard worlds, which generates indeterminate worlds, or by taking those statements as true in a non-standard world (...) which are true in either of two standards worlds, which generates inconsistent worlds. (shrink)